Every time you mention Joe Wilson, you should note that everything he said about Niger was a complete and total lie.

As the Senate Intelligence Committee report pointed out, what he found in Niger confirmed Saddam's attempt to get uranium there, not refuted it.

Yes... I guess I should. I keep meaning to link the various pieces pointing this out, but I don't.

Isn't this common conservative knowledge?

Maybe around here, but lots of people brain-dumped everything they knew about this crap after November 2.

Yes, every Republican I know works on Democratic presidential campaigns.

Pffft.

I hate our MSM so fucking much today. Not once has ANY article on the Plame affair mentioned the fact WILSON IS A PROVEN LIAR!!

Not one fucking mention of the Senate report. Unbelieveable.

BTW, I posted the Senate report stuff on Eschaton for fun, and (surprise!) I was called delusional for saying Wilson lied.

So much for the "reality-based" community. Details on my blog, in the unlikely event anyone cares to read about how grass is green, the sky is blue, and liberals on Atrios' blog are ignorant.

That "confirmation" in the SIC report is about as tenuous and shaky as it could possibly be: Joe Wilson's report of a conversation he had with former Nigerien Prime Minister Mayaki about a conversation Mayaki had with a "businessman" about having a conversation with an Iraqi trade delegation that Mayaki "interpreted" would be about uranium, if the conversation (the last one) had ever been allowed to happen. Whew. That takes hearsay to a new dimension--what someone said someone said they think they would have heard someone say. All this, of course, from what someone told the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Sceptical:

Yes, one could make the same complaint about Wilson's entire visit, leading to the presumption that he grossly overstated the reliability of his findings.

And yet such a report is seen as "confirmation?" Of all the cherries to pick, it would seem the least promising. And what were his findings, exactly? That he concluded something that didn't actually happen was unlikely to have happened?

The issue is that he claimed that Iraq had made no overtures to Niger, when in fact his own report said that it had. Certainly doesn't lend confidence to anything else he's said.

His own report, as I thought we established, said no such thing. It was, it seems to me, a rather diaphonous relation of a conversation about a conversation leading to a conversation that never happened. To say that it "confirmed" anything about an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger is quite a stretch.

To be honest, I really don't have much to add to what the Powerline folks said a year ago:

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/007135.php

Either you find that it seriously undermines Wilson's credibility, or you don't. In my view, whether it "confirmed" Iraq's intent or not, it certainly confirmed that Wilson was not entirely forthcoming about the results of this trip.

You're a Democrat? TREASON!

Just kidding.

It seems to me that the source for all this, any possible flaws notwithstanding, more authoritative than a blog at any rate, is the Senate Intelligence Committee report:



http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf



In the section on Niger, it attempts to determine how it was that reports of a uranium "contract" between Iraq and Niger, reports founded on a forgery, came to be cited by the president publicly as cause for alarm. It seems to go without saying, in the SIC report, that Wilson's conclusions from his trip to ascertain the veracity of such a deal aligned quite neatly with the fact that no such deal existed, and constituted early warning that the administration would promulgate a falsehood. It also makes clear that certain groups within the executive, i.e., the State Dept., reasonably interpreted Wilson's opinions as further support for their suspicion that any such uranium deal was highly unlikely. As it turned out, he was correct, and the reasons he gave were sound ones. In fact, the Intelligence Comittee concludes that a serious lapse had occurred if indeed the Vice President had not been apprised of Wilson's report (Conclusion 14). I fail to see how any of this "confirmed Saddam's attempt to get uranium there, not refuted it", as asserted by the first poster here.

Thanks for the link - I skimmed the relevant section. I must say that it did nothing to change my view. It is clear that the uranium deal was unlikely, since Niger was abiding by the restraints placed upon it. It is also clear that Mayaki thought that a deal had been solicited.

Since Wilson claimed that a deal had not been solicited, despite reporting Mayaki's comments to the CIA, it seems to me he was playing very loosely with the truth. The question on the table is not the quality of the evidence, but whether there was any evidence at all. Wilson said there was not.

Actually, as I originally pointed out, it is asserted that Wilson said Mayaki suspected a deal would have been solicited based on the veiled insinuation (perhaps) of an anonymous (to us) "businessman" several years prior. To me this is the precise opposite of "clear," and hardly constitutes evidence for a solicitation. In fact, Mayaki seems to be saying the opposite: that when he subsequently met an Iraqi trade delegation, no such solicitation was proffered (although he oddly, vaguely, and perhaps disingenuously, credits himself for the absence of such a solicitation).

Wilson: not even nominally a Republican

I'm afraid we're getting down to the definition of what "is" is. Here's the actual text we're discussing:

"Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, XXXX businessman, approached him and and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi trade delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq." (p. 43)"

There's some coy phraseology here in terms of Mayaki letting "the matter drop," so that it's unclear if the topic was broached at the meeting. But it would be odd for him to mention the incident at all if they had held the meeting and it turned out his interpretation was wrong. My take on the coyness is that Mayaki was trying to avoid offending the Iraqis, so he took the meeting, but he didn't want to get in trouble with the UN, so he did not directly state that a yellowcake discussion took place. Note that in contrast to your original posting, the meeting did take place, making the link substantially less tenuous.

If you read the summary of the reports officer's grading of Wilson's report on p. 46, he says that this story of Mayaki's was the most important fact in Wilson's report. In the following paragraph it states that the DIA and CIA placed little value on the report, except for Mayaki's story, which they found "interesting."

This will have to be my final posting on the matter, since I owe the world a proposal or two by 6 am EST. But I would ask: was there really "no" evidence that Iraq was soliciting yellowcake, or was it just "weak" evidence? In my view it is slightly better than weak, and so I feel comfortable in saying the Wilson dissembled. The evidence may speak to you differently, but given the several other untruths the Intelligence Committe uncovered in Wilson's statements to the press, one could still easily draw the same conclusion as I.

I do not dispute the meaning of the word "is". But I do believe careful reading of the SIC report, and apparently my posts, is in order. That a meeting between Mayaki and the Iraqi trade delegation took place is no way "in contrast" to my original post: I wrote that a conversation, i.e., a conversation about a uranium deal with the Iraqis, never took place. To imagine the SIC report "confirms" such a conversation happened is to presume that one can read Mayaki's mind through several layers of blurry time-delayed hearsay, a feat I am prepared to characterize as highly improbable. It apparently must be noted that Mayaki's "interpretation" extends only as far as the utterance of a "businessman." While, as I say, there is as yet no confusion over the definition of the word "is," I am afraid I am not quite clear on your definition of the word "confirm."

That the CIA mishandled, misinterpreted and neglected key facts and indicators throughout the length and breadth of the fiasco is exactly what the SIC report establishes in its section on the false Niger uranium "deal," and concludes, as I noted above, that the intelligence chain was gravely remiss in not alerting the administration's highest levels of Wilson's findings. In other words, it is precisely the DIA/CIA's misallocation of "value" in the evidence available that is found wanting, and therefore the conclusions they drew are of little value themselves.

I apologize for equating "meeting" with "converstation," but as I pointed out above, it seems likely to me that some form of "conversation" did take place at the trade meeting.

Before I continue, perhaps we should clear one thing up - I am not the orginal poster who used the word "confirmed." I have no interest in defending that usage, and have not been attempting to do so during this discussion. I agree that the evidence supplied in Wilson's report is not sufficient to "confirm" that a deal was discussed.

My point has been that it is also certainly not sufficient to "confirm" that a deal was not discussed, as Wilson stated to the press. Taking the evidence at face value, we have no reason to reject Mayaki's assertion that the subject was subtly broached. It is not strong evidence for, but it is certainly not evidence against, the claim that Iraq was seeking yellowcake. Since Wilson told the press that the President's "16 words" were a blatant lie because his report found no evidence that Iraq was seeking yellowcake, he lied.

It is not clear to me from reading Conclusion 14 (p. 74) whether the Committee is criticizing the CIA because of the value of the evidence, or because of the breakdown in communication within the administration. I can't find anything that says they placed any more value on Wilson's report than the CIA did, so I suspect it is the latter.

I think its appearant the Senate committee found reason to reject Mayaki's inuendo (not assertion) and they evidently placed more value on Wilson's report than the CIA by finding fault that it didn't rise to Cheney's attention. Personally, I think the CIA is covering for Cheney.

I find it highly dubious, in light of the administration's and indeed Cheney's stated objectives before even 9/11 to involve us in an overthrow of Saddam, that this information was suppressed and that false and forgered allegations against Iraq were cited as excuses for the Iraqi debacle, in the State of the Union address no less -- eventhough evidence of these allegations were investigated beforehand and discredited by Wilson.

What really makes this whole affair stink to high heaven is the dirty politics played out by Karl Rove consequent to Wilson going public.

Why isn't anyone talking about whitewashing and coverup of the Valerie Plame issue? Or is everyone afraid this supposedly high-minded adminstration will focus their nefarious methods on the detractors?

I think its appearant the Senate committee found reason to reject Mayaki's inuendo (not assertion) and they evidently placed more value on Wilson's report than the CIA by finding fault that it didn't rise to Cheney's attention. Personally, I think the CIA is covering for Cheney.

I find it highly dubious, in light of the administration's and indeed Cheney's stated objectives before even 9/11 to involve us in an overthrow of Saddam, that this information was suppressed and that false and forgered allegations against Iraq were cited as excuses for the Iraqi debacle, in the State of the Union address no less -- eventhough evidence of these allegations were investigated beforehand and discredited by Wilson.

What really makes this whole affair stink to high heaven is the dirty politics played out by Karl Rove consequent to Wilson going public.

Why isn't anyone talking about whitewashing and coverup of the Valerie Plame issue? Or is everyone afraid this supposedly high-minded adminstration will focus their nefarious methods on the detractors?

HalfByte:

Mayaki asserted that there was an innuendo - so "assertion" is correct. And it is not at all apparent that the Senate placed any value on Wilson's report - the wording in Conclusion 14 indicates that they were more concerned with coordination than Wilson's anemic results.

The rest of your comment is speculative and inflammatory.

Oh come on Geoff, everybody knows Iraq wanted to open up secret trade negotiations to buy cowpeas and onions!

Goats, they had enough of those.

Yeah!

Kind of weak though, "an assertion of an innuendo".

That's like me saying there's a concrete but vague belief based on someone else's recall of their interpretation of events that may or may not be accurate.

Niger has much more to offer the world than agriculture -- and although I can't say it's been coming from you, I find many posts on this site more than inflammatory.

I don't think those trade negotiations were all that secret. Most trade negotiations are held privately so as not to influence the markets but secret means there would be a higher level of, well, secretiveness regarding the proceedings. There would not only be a lack of announcement but also denials and distractions. None of that was ever mentioned or "asserted". I find it very odd that we aren't applying our American Tradition of "innocent till proven guilty" and "benefit of the doubt" regarding evidence obtained from someone whose served under the direction of Presidents from both parties.

Also, I find how the administration has handled this whole issue as linked with the Valerie Plame issue as being more than inflammatory. It's a national disgrace unfolding before our eyes, albeit ever so slowly due to the ongoing efforts at stonewalling, whitewashing, and coverup.

Funny how this culture of life the president talks about permeating his followers, so readily attempted to sacrifice someone that took risks for this country and was serving this country up to and including the moment the leaker perpetrated their dastardly deed.

Make that leakerZ.
Senior level ones at that!

No apology is necessary, unless, of course, you meant to malign me. I didn't take it that way, and actually found your misreading of my post instructive. Is your interpretation of Wilson's story possible? Perhaps. But as is to be expected with such tenuous tales, plausible scenarios to explain them may be produced at will. My personal favorite, somewhat more amenable to Occam's Razor than yours, I believe, is that, given the notorious propensity of the CIA to fund creatures such as Mayaki in their clumsy efforts to gain "human intelligence" in exotic locales, and given the notorious venality of African politicians, Mayaki's performance should be seen as an attempt to peddle himself as an "asset." Viewed in this light, there is a significant chance that his story is almost entirely fiction, and a near certainty that it is highly embellished. Indeed, one wonders if and how Wilson arranged compensation for Mayaki's strenuous recollections, and I suppose if the SIC bothered itself about such details, they are buried under the acres of stricken text. Though I am fond of my interpretation, I would not say that Wilson's report "confirms" it or even suggests that Mayaki is a "liar." I have only my suspicions, and I know the difference between them and "evidence," and I would be embarrassed to confuse the two. At times, you seem to understand this distinction as well, and agree that Wilson's findings do not support any conclusion that the Iraqis sought uranium from Niger; yet at other times you seem to lose the distinction--for instance when you claim that Wilson lied when he claimed what you readily admit.


That the SIC valued Wilson's report differently than the CIA is simply obvious from the fact that the SIC found it should have been promoted, and the CIA didn't. When interpreting this conclusion, I think one should bear in mind its purpose: the SIC report's section on Niger is not meant to be a general audit of reporting procedure. Rather, it is a focused attempt to understand how the president cited a forgery in a public speech, and how such a blunder could have been prevented. I am stumped as to how you suppose the promotion of Wilson's report, which you characterize as "flimsy" and valueless, would have served to avert the president's repetition of an outright lie.

Sceptical:

Here are what I believe to be our points of agreement and disagreement:

1) There was no Iraq-Niger deal, and Wilson's report supports that: Agreed!!

2) There is not sufficient evidence in Wilson's report to definitively state that Iraq was seeking yellowcake from Niger: Agreed!!

3) There was not sufficient evidence in Wilson's report to state that Iraq was *not* seeking yellowcake, and in fact there is weak evidence that it was: I, at least, believe that this is incontrovertible.

4) Wilson stated in several press interviews that his report to the CIA showed that there was no evidence that Iraq had sought yellowcake. To me, that means that not only did he overstate the value of his results, he baldly lied.

You seem to be focusing on whether Niger actually consummated the deal with Iraq, rather than whether Wilson reported evidence that Iraq merely sought such a deal.

I brought up the CIA/DIA assessment simply to show that if any part of Wilson's report should *not* have been overlooked, it was that portion referring to Mayaki. I don't think Wilson's report was worth briefing to the Administration, and as I wrote above, my supposition is that the SIC was really striving to improve internal communications.

"The president's repitition of an outright lie" is not really part of the discussion on the table, but I think that certainly that characterization is a gross misrepresentation of the "16 words" controversy. While I agree that the "16 words" did not meet the standards one would expect for a SOTU speech, I don't believe that one could fairly call them "an outright lie."

I think your speculations concerning Mayaki's possible situation and motivations are interesting, although as a former member of Niger's administration, he may not have been a highly prized asset.

It is gratifying to see how emphatically agreeable we are. Your third and fourth points are somewhat muddled and undermined by the second, I think. The "evidence" (which you downgrade to "weak evidence"), supports no conclusion, as you enthusiastically agree. But data which supports no conclusion, in my opinion, hardly merits the term "evidence," i.e., nothing is "evident" from it. Indeed, Wilson's report does not support the conclusion that the Iraqi delegates solicited Mayaki for anything in particular, let alone uranium, and therefore is not "evidence," weak or otherwise. I therefore think it is hardly a "bald lie" to point out that Wilson's trip found no evidence of an Iraqi solicitation for any sort of uranium. I think we would do well to keep in mind the purpose of Wilson's trip: to ascertain whether the "contract" for "500 tons" of uranium between Niger and Iraq was consummated or even existed. Wilson, for various sound reasons, correctly concluded from his trip that it was a fiction.


You seriously misunderstand the SIC report if you believe the conclusions in the Niger section are an attempt to simply "improve internal communications." As I've pointed out twice already, what the SIC was "striving" to achieve in that section is a dissection of how the president's blunder occurred, and how it could have been avoided. It is obvious to me that they conclude Wilson's report might have helped avert it, if it had been brought to the vice-president's attention.


I fail to see how the phrase "repetition of an outright lie" is a "gross misreprentation" of the "16 words." The president said "...the British government has learned...," which everyone admits is a citation of a forged document. Few things are as deserving of the label "outright lie" as a forgery, and I believe a "citation" is, in a certain important sense, a "repetition." Therefore, "repetition of an outright lie" is a perfectly acceptable, if somewhat forthright, description of the "16 words."

I assure you sir that the muddlement is all yours. As I said previously, on the face of it, Mayaki told Wilson that he thought that Iraq was sniffing around trying to buy yellowcake. This seems plausible, since of Niger's four significant exports, only yellowcake would be attractive to Iraq. Wilson thought the information important enough to include in his report, and there is no mention in the SIC that he downgraded or discounted the information.

That is "evidence" in my parlance: arbitrarily deciding to round it down to zero because it is vague is contrary to the dictates of scientific inquiry (a field in which I labor). The presence of vague evidence suggests that more evidence should be gathered so that a definitive determination may finally be made. It certainly does not suggest that it should be discarded simply because it cannot stand on its own.

I do agree that Wilson was correct in his determination that no deal existed, but that is irrelevant.

The SIC's recommendation will have to be an area where we disagree. Wilson's trip was a small portion of the overall intelligence operation, he didn't get to speak to current government officials, and his investigation consisted of running down a list of vague talking points while sipping mint tea. None of those circumstances are his fault - it's what the CIA wanted, and he seems to have done a decent job at it. But I think you and he are greatly inflating the trip's contribution to the inteligence gathering effort.

As far as the "16 words" go, I'm surprised you ignore the fact the British government claimed that there were other sources aside from the forged memos, and that they still stand by that claim. Therefore, no one conversant with the situation "admits" that his comment was "a citation of a forged document."

Tell me if this makes sense to you. In the passage we've been discussing, the original Iraqi contact "insisted" that Mayake take a meeting with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations." Then on page 44 it says:

" . . . because Mayaki was wary of discussing any trade issues with a country under UN sanctions, he made a successful effort to steer the conversation away from a discussion of trade with the Iraqi delegation."

So what did they talk about? The subject of the meeting is trade and Mayaki steers the conversation away from it? This sounds like Mayaki dissembling to cover his aft end.

Your assurances notwithstanding, I believe my points thus far to be clearly and unambiguously stated in plain English, and in no way "muddled." They do not contradict each other, or even undermine one another, as far as I can tell. If anything seems unclear to you, please let me know.


It will be refreshing to review the facts once again, if you choose. Mayaki never said Iraqis were "fishing" for anything, as far as we know: instead he attributes an insinuation to a "businessman" whose nationality, let alone identity, is apparently classified or unknown. Mayaki mentions a subsequent meeting with Iraqi delegates (this review has been enlightening--a more careful reading on my part has shown that we have been inaccurate in describing the Iraqi visit as a "trade delegation", it is nowhere referred to as such, and is probably the visit of the Iraqi Vatican ambassador in April of 1999), but tells us nothing about what transpired, except to mention that "matters were dropped" due to UN trade sanctions. We should keep in mind that those trade sanctions prohibited trade with Iraq for anything other than food or medicine. It just so happens that one of Niger's exports is raw cotton, one of the world's most common internationally traded commodities, but neither food nor medicine (although, to be honest, I have no idea whether the sanctions made provisions for such essentials as cotton or leather). Significantly, a subsequent Defense Humint Service examination of cargo consigned to Iraq in a Benin warehouse found bales of cotton, leading me to wonder where exactly Mayaki let matters drop. But still I would refrain from describing Wilson's report as "evidence" that Mayaki cut a cotton deal under the table with the Iraqis. I cannot speak for your parlance, but the term "evidence" has a firm definition as something which furnishes direct testimony or proof of an assertion--hints, suggestions, assumptions and whimsical scenarios do not conform to this definition. Even most species of deduction are not properly considered "evidence," in my view. "Proof" is a central concept to the definition of "evidence," and Mayaki's story--tantalizing as it might be with respect to many mutually contradictory affairs--is nowhere in the vicinity of proof, as you readily concede.


By the way, with respect to an earlier supposition of yours that Mayaki "may not have been a highly prized asset": this does not bear on whether he thought it was worth the effort to advertize himself as one, "highly prized" or not. And as we all know, advertisements are not well known for their veracity.


If you are looking for an "inflation" of Wilson's report, look no further than the SIC Iraq Intelligence report. Your attempt to gloss over its "Conclusion 14" in the Niger section can only be based on a mistake concerning its import and purpose. While it does indeed flag a "breakdown in communication," one needs to understand how remedying that particular breakdown might have served to avert the subsequent presidential blunder.


The British, understandably, feel quite stung by this whole affair, and have examined the matter in their Parliamentary counterpart to the Senate Intelligence Committee report on Iraq Intelligence, the so-called "Butler report":

www.butlerreview.com/report/report.pdf [unfortunately, I could not properly paste the link here because this "Ace of Spades HQ" site flagged "org . uk" as "questionable content", perhaps thereby throwing its own 2 cents into the discourse: just replace the ".com" in it with "org . uk", without the spaces]

In it, they are prepared to offer no other source for their allegation than a trip the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican made to Africa in 1999, which they themselves characterize as weak grounds for any conclusion. There have been some British press reports indicating that a "Somali businessman" may have been the source of these rumors. The Butler Report supports the suspicion among many "conversant" with the whole affair that the whole "Niger deal" story--and much else--blossomed in a classic "echo chamber," whereby the various intelligence services--French, British, Italian, American--all exchanged and amplified the same rumor based on the same forged documents and Iraqi African junket. The fact that the SIC report analyzes the provenance of the "16 words" in the context of an investigation of the forgery and how it came to be accepted by the CIA as "evidence" clearly shows that those most "conversant" with the matter, i.e., the Senate Intelligence Committee, do in fact admit the false SOTU assertion was founded upon it.

"Muddlement"? you even muddle the word "muddle". Kinda hard to follow the thread when you can't find the word to describe the color in this hypnotic tapestry, isn't it?
Maybe you meant "Middlemen"?
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=muddlement

And as to the point about Ma-yuk-i, of course he'd exaggerate his innuendo, so as to give himself more heft in these intelligence circles (and I do mean circles) our military and CIA operatives seem to continually setup with questionable people. Him being a former player in the government would, of course, give even more credence to the theory that he'd be inticed to inflate his dealings in order to worm his way back into things. I wouldn't give his statements any worth, but at least Wilson went the extra yard and checked out things independently by discussing this episode while there with other "conversants".

Seems to me he picked apart the supposed intel on Iraq and reported its dubiousness, but alas it fell on deaf ears as this administration (especially the neo-wonks of Perle and Wolfowitz as they whispered in Cheneys ear) had already made up their minds and thusly suppressed the info from Wilson's report so they could go ahead with their nefarious designs. Unfortunately, one of the casualties happened to be speach being uttered by the President of the United States during a State of the Union address. I guess they viewed that as acceptable collateral damage.

And all the while the media played along like the docile lambs they've been since Starr finished tearing apart Clinton. Complicity is the word I'm looking for here regarding those "Fair and Balanced" reporters the White House plants for their briefings.

I'm just loving the irony of this site flagging that british document as having "questionable content". Jeez, talk about disregarding your own advisors messages seems to be in vogue for these right-wingers nowadays.

Sceptical:

Sorry to be brief, but I just lost two versions of my response and have no energy left for a third (curse for a novice!). The upshot is that you and I have a strong disagreement concerning the definition of the word "evidence." I follow the first definition provided by the online American Heritage dictionary - you seem to be following an entirely different definition. I believe that the entirety of our disagreement can be resolved by addressing this semantic difference.

And Half-Byte - I would enjoy including you in this discussion if you would be less conjectural and partisan. I am also disappointed to find that your are sort to engage in ad hominem attacks following my admittedly self-indulgent, but harmless, bit of word play (you caught me - I made up the word "muddlement" because I thought it was funny). If you could find your way to following Sceptical's lead, we might be able to engage in mutually profitable discourse. Otherwise you're just posting to the void.

I use Merriam-Webster's but we can refer to American Heritage, if you like. As a noun, its first definition is something "helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment." We have established, it seems to me, that Wilson's story about Mayaki's story about a conversation with a "businessman" about a conversation he should have had with Iraqis, but didn't, helps us conclude nothing. The second definition is "something indicative; an outward sign." Again, I think the many plausible explanations for the Mayaki tale demonstrate that nothing in particular is indicated by it. The third definition, referencing legal admissibility is obviously inappropriate: hearsay is inadmissible. The other definitions, as a transitive verb and an idiom, seem almost tailored by American Heritage to exclude our subject: "To indicate clearly, exemplify or prove," that which is "plainly visible." The etymology is even more forthright: from the Latin evidentia, evidens, evident, meaning "obvious." This awkward and attenuated chain of hearsay in Wilson's Niger report rises to none of these definitions or intended meanings. The claims you assert that it supports are not made "obvious", "plainly visible," or "proven" by Mayaki's story. They are not "indicated" by it, his story is no "outward sign," and we are not assisted in any way to a "conclusion" or "judgement" of them in the light of it. In short, by American Heritage's definition, and our close examination of the SIC report's text, the Mayaki affair is simply not "evidence."

I'm afraid I have to reject your interpretation of the first definition. Because a piece of evidence (say a strand of hair from a murder investigation) is not enough to, on its own, support a conclusion, does not mean it is not evidence. If we're going to find this semantic divide unbroachable, then let me conclude this entertaining exchange before it becomes tiresome.

1) Mayaki told Wilson his story.
2) Wilson thought the story sufficiently interesting to report it to the CIA
3)Both the CIA and DIA thought that the story was the only "interesting" component of his report.
4) Wilson then told the press that his report showed that there was no evidence for the "Iraq seeking yellowcake from Africa" claim.

You may quibble about the meaning of evidence, but I don't believe that Wilson himself has ever discounted Mayaki's story.

And I think that you should re-read the Butler report. I do not think it says what you think it says. You should also check Niger's cotton exports - all of 1000 tons in 2002 (out of 723,000 tons exported by eight West African countries).

The "semantic divide" can be easily bridged by an honest assessment of the definition you pointed me towards, and what the Mayaki story establishes. The definition is straightforward and easily understood. The question then turns on whether the Mayaki tale conforms to it. Are we assisted in any way to "form a conclusion or judgement" about whether the Iraqis sought uranium from Niger? We are not. The story itself does not state that Mayaki was approached by any Iraqis to provide uranium, or that the subject was even broached by them. He interprets a "businessman's" words to mean that he was being approached, but nowhere is it stated that this "businessman" was Iraqi, represented Iraq, or acted with the knowledge of any Iraqi. We can thus impute just about any identity and motivation to this character. When Iraqis finally do enter the story, they do not say a word about uranium or anything else. The story also has a sensible enough context to cast doubt on any or all of its content. In other words, plausible scenarios that contain it fan out in all directions, and the story itself gives no indication which may be closest to the truth. Quite unlike a strand of hair. A strand of hair may indeed support a conclusion: for instance that someone was present in a room or vehicle (a "conclusion" it might directly establish). His or her presence there may then support further conclusions, and therefore "help us in forming a judgement." This would be "evidence." But if one were to find a strand of a person's hair in that person's own home, it would establish nothing, since innumerable--as innumerable as there are hairs on one's head--plausible explanations can be produced for its presence. It is not "evidence." Mayaki's tale resembles this latter state of affairs: there are many equally reasonable interpretations of it. In fact, it is considerably weaker, since it is not physical, or even direct testimony--it is hearsay, and doubly so. It is more like someone saying that they heard someone say that someone else said that if they checked the room, they'd find a hair, but that they actually didn't bother--to call this "evidence" is to defile the very concept. By the way, there are very good reasons why hearsay is rejected as a form of evidence in precisely the sort of forum--a murder case--you invoke. I invite you to ponder why that is the case.

Was there something I missed in the Butler Report? Do the British offer any other source for their claims besides a forged document and a trip through Africa by the Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See? If you see anything of the sort, please bring it to my attention. I imagine the British intelligence organization painfully wincing to see this matter being brought up again. Their stance here is embarrassingly obvious: a routine leak of another half-way credible source for the "uranium sought from Africa" claim would do so much to clear their tattered image, yet they have none, so they clam up, definitely refrain from repeating the claim, and wait until the whole thing becomes a historical footnote. I am pretty sure that their "other sources" have turned out to be the French, Italians, etc. who were basing their assessments on the forgery, and what they were hearing from each other--an echo chamber, as I said.

As I also said, and you have been so kind as to confirm, cotton is one of Niger's exports, amounting to twice the weight (and thus heaven knows how many times the volume, and what tiny fraction the value) as the supposed "deal" for yellowcake was to transfer. And as I pointed out, cotton constituted the only shred of physical evidence (naught but a strand of hair?) ever mentioned in the SIC report regarding African trade with Iraq. One wonders--cotton being neither food nor medicine--whether it was a violation of UN trade sanctions nonetheless. And now that we are on the subject of Niger's exports, since the mining, processing, marketing and shipping of Niger's entire uranium output is under the exclusive control of a French firm, it can be thought of as only nominally a Nigerien export: the uranium leaves the country, and a check arrives--no actual Nigerien institution is involved with anything besides cashing the check.

Sceptical:

I think it's best to end this on a pleasant note of disagreement, so I shall attempt to wrest my hands from the keyboard before I succumb to my natural instincts to assail your points. It has been a pleasure.