Judge Denies Biden Administration's Motion to Stay His Injunction, Which Prohibits Biden's Censors From Contacting Social Media Companies to Urge or Pressure Them Into Censoring Protected Speech

Boy when you put it like that, it's hard to see how the Biden Administration isn't just demanding the right to censor enemies' speech.

Which is what the state AGs et al. argued in their brief opposing the government's motion:

The Court's preliminary injunction, Doc. 294, prevents Defendants only from doing what the First Amendment plainly forbids--i.e., "urging, encouraging, pressuring, or inducing ... the removal, deletion, suppression, or reduction of content containing protected free speech posted on social-media platforms." Id. at 4. Before the injunction was entered, Defendants spent months attempting to identify areas of legitimate government conduct that such an injunction might disrupt. They submitted five declarations from senior federal officials identifying areas of government speech and conduct with which, they claimed, an injunction enforcing First Amendment rights might interfere. See, e.g., Doc. 266, at 258. The Court carefully addressed all those concerns by providing eight clear and specific exclusions to the injunction, which specify areas of legitimate government speech and conduct that the injunction does not prohibit. Doc. 294, at 5-6 (listing conduct that is "NOT prohibited by this Preliminary Injunction").

Defendants now seek to stay the preliminary injunction, claiming that the injunction "may" cause "grave harm" by "prevent[ing] the Government from engaging in a vast range of lawful and responsible conduct." Doc. 297-1, at 1. But, after months of searching on this very issue, Defendants do not identify a single specific example of supposedly "grave harm" that the injunction might cause, or a single specific example of "lawful and responsible" government conduct that the injunction prevents. See id. at 1-6. By its plain terms, the injunction permits Defendants to engage in the full range of permissible Government speech and conduct--such as "(1) informing social-media companies of postings involving criminal activity or criminal conspiracies;" "(2) contacting and/or notifying social-media companies of national security threats, extortion, or other threats posted on its platform;" "(3) contacting and/or notifying social- media companies about criminal efforts to suppress voting, to provide illegal campaign contributions, of cyber-attacks against election infrastructure, or foreign attempts to influence elections;" "(4) informing social-media companies of threats that threaten the public safety or security of the United States;" and "(5) exercising permissible public government speech promoting government policies or views on matters of public concern," among others. Doc. 294,
at 5-6.

In the face of these clear and specific authorizations, Defendants' conclusory speculative assertion of "grave harm" that the injunction "may be read" to cause, Doc. 297-1, at 1--devoid of any specific examples or evidence of such harm--does not warrant an extraordinary stay.

In fact, Defendants identify only two vague categories of supposedly legitimate
government conduct that the injunction supposedly "may be read" to prevent: "[1] speaking on matters of public concern" and "[2] working with social media companies on initiatives to prevent grave harm to the American people and our democratic processes." Id. As to the first, the injunction explicitly authorized the Government to "speak[] on matters of public concern." 294, at 6 (permitting Defendants to "(5) exercise[e] permissible public government speech
promoting government policies or views on matters of public concern").

The second point, therefore, reflects the Government's only real concern--i.e., that the injunction will prevent Defendants from "working with social media companies on initiatives to prevent grave harm to the American people and our democratic processes." But the evidence in this case overwhelmingly shows that the way the Government supposedly "prevent[s] grave harm to the American people and our democratic processes" is to pressure and induce social-media platforms to censor disfavored viewpoints on COVID-19, elections, and other core political speech. The Government's assertion of "grave harm," therefore, boils down to the claim that it should be allowed to continue violating the First Amendment.

In the end, their position is fundamentally defiant toward the Court's judgment. It demonstrates that the Government will continue violating First Amendment rights by censoring core political speech on social media as soon as it can get away with it. The motion to stay should be denied.

The judge agreed:

Biden already filed papers to appeal the original injunction. It will be heard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and then, if Biden loses again, it will be appealed to the Supreme Court.

He will also appeal this ruling about the injunction. A preliminary injunction is a remedy issued before a trial, to stop harm that's happening now and will continue happening if a judge does not issue an order to stop that harm. The Fifth Circuit will also rule on whether the injunction remains in force. It will probably be a very expedited hearing.

In the meantime, Biden's Rogue Government remains legally prohibited from its lawless course of censoring political enemies' speech.

But, as the state AGs said -- the Rogue Government is "in defiance" against the order. They will probably continue breaking the law.

posted by Lamont the Big Dummy at 03:27 PM

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