A View Of The War In Gaza [Diogenes]

Israel’s War and Tactics

The typical Hamas fighter is reasonably educated (probably to a 10th grade level in US standards) and trained in basic infantry tactics. He primarily comes from the camps in Gaza and/or the West Bank and has been taught since day one to hate Jews. Equipment includes a rifle, probably an AK-47 or modified variant, squad level machineguns (PKM) some heavier MGs up to 50cal, the ubiquitous RPG, mortars, and drones. They fight as a basic army unit, with squads, platoon and companies. These fighters are probably just a bit more professional, more disciplined than their predecessors. By that I mean historically it was not unusual for Muslims to attack, take an objective, and then stop to ransack the objective. We saw some of this on 10/7 but I sense it was limited. Probably not much of that in Gaza today. Today, Hamas is no longer a mob of irregulars but a hybrid force similar to any that can be fielded by any state actor.

Israeli soldiers are well educated and come from across the Israeli social spectrum. Their equipment is modern, reliable, effective and adapted to fit their particular tactical and operational environment. The troops are members of squads, platoons, companies and battalions, all belonging to brigades except those separate battalions within an Israeli division. There are roughly 11 Brigade sized units surrounding the Gaza strip and each is reinforced with artillery and close air support.

Wars are different. Clausewitz observed, the fundamental nature of war may be unchanging, but the character of individual wars “vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.”

Today’s fight for the IDF is a lot like their last event in 2014, but different too. I have said several times this fight is a blend (hybrid) of urban assault and siege. A key component here is the subterranean operations that the IDF faces. We last experienced this with the tunnels in Viet Nam, think Cu Chi, which was a form of battle we never really controlled. Further, look up. Drones have taken on a life of their own and are used heavily by both sides. Counter Drone procedures are still evolving.

Hamas leadership claimed in a Reuters interview that they have 40,000 trained fighters, and they were trained, armed, and funded by Iran. Because Hamas said it, it is probably not accurate, but even half that number is a credible fighting force. Plus, Hamas is on the defense, which historically enjoys a 3:1 advantage over the attacker, a figure that has remained remarkably constant over the centuries. Israel has many more in its active and reserve forces, not to mention the callup of over 150,000 from all over the world.

As mentioned by Clausewitz above, wars vary. In 2014, Israel’s Operation Protective Edge resulted in several Lessons Learned. They are: precision fires are limited in their effects (both artillery and air support); armor protection technologies needed improvement (urban environments are not friendly to vehicles, particularly armored ones); Counter Tunnel (Subterranean) Operations are critical; and, Iron Dome is important.

What has changed since 2014

First, Precision fire in an urban setting. The nature and brutality of the Hamas attack, plus Netanyahu’s declaration of war has changed the importance of this as the goal. Previously the IDF sought to limit civilian casualties. Today, the IDF still seeks to do this, but casualties no longer has a veto effect on many specific clashes with Hamas. Further, IDF intelligence collection is better than ever and makes precision targeting better.

Armor protection has been improved. According to one source, only 6 Israeli tanks have been destroyed so far. A remarkable feat given the terrain in which they are fighting and the proliferation of the RPG. Next, counter tunnel operations are far more sophisticated now than in 2014. The IDF has created a unique engineer battalion devoted to just this kind of fighting. Subterranean warfare is a weird, disorienting, and scary thing. They have become experts at it. Plus, given precision attack mentioned above, the accurate application of bunker busting bombs makes this kind of effort problematic for Hamas. Volunteers will be harder to get in the future.

The Iron Dome is an interesting assessment. Its effectiveness is nothing short of spectacular. In fact, prior to 10/7, The Dome’s ability to limit Israeli casualties was one of the restraints put on Israeli leadership in the face of previous rocket attacks. How can you justify a massive bombardment when sure, they launched a hundred rockets, but only two Israelis died? On 10/7 we saw that thousands of rockets launched at the Dome can overwhelm it. Ironically, this worked to Israel’s advantage. There were casualties, significant ones, and the gloves came off. Interestingly, the rockets persist. Hamas has shown incredible logistics foresight in their rocket war. It’s hard to hide that much, but they have done so.

Other considerations are available to Israel. For one, time is on their side…for now and into the next several months. Netanyahu’s biggest detractor is Biden and his administration, and he can keep them at bay. For now. Biden is weak and he is surrounded with advisors all singing the same tune. He gets no different opinion that should allow leaders to come to a more comprehensive plan. Bibi can work with that. This, in my opinion, includes the media. He is in position to use global media to the detriment of American networks who will have to at least show some impartiality in their coverage. But this time window isn’t indefinite. He needs to use this time wisely. And I suspect he will.

PW’s

I doubt the IDF are taking many prisoners of war, but they do need them for intelligence collection and to assess the general state of their opponents. Are they hungry, thirsty, dirty, tired, hopeless, still well armed, etc? But as the fight continues, more and more will seek to surrender, particularly if they get shot by their leaders if they try to retreat into southern Gaza. Time will tell, but PWs in the thousands are not an impossibility. The IDF will need to plan for that. This planning also applies to the refugees. The IDF has opened a road south for refugees to flee the affected areas and the IDF continues to encourage civilians to leave. Strategically, the Israeli government is already working on concepts for “The Day After Hamas.” Interesting title. One report said the Egyptians are working with them.

Tactical Situation

Gaza has been split at the Wadi south of Gaza City. IDF troops are now pressuring Hamas on all sides while trying to evacuate as many refugees as they can. Their fighting has been up close and personal. They advance, attack a specific objective, dig in, gather intel (which leads to other objectives) and bring up armor. The armor is bermed for protection, and they provide covering fire. Then the infantry and engineers advance to the next objective. In Gaza and the urban areas, objectives are measured in hundreds of meters. Seldom further. They fight day and night. The primary objective on the IDF has been to split Gaza, isolate Gaza City, and find and kill the Hamas leadership, and destroy the tunnels. Now they begin to squeeze. Taking their time, Hamas will go hungry, thirsty, run short of munitions, and grow miserable in the constant bombing. I suspect it will take them at least a month to finish in the north. The South is a different battle. Refugees, retreating fighters, Hamas leadership trying to escape, and Egyptians, all muddled together. This is where it will get ugly. This is where, in my opinion, that Israel must drive for absolute victory. The primary obstacle will be how heavily has Hamas prepared the south? If like the north, then look for a longer fight. If not as much, Israel will make faster gains. We shall see soon enough.

["Diogenes" has multiple graduate degrees with a focus on the Middle East, and an Army Intelligence Officer graduate of both the Army and USMC Command and Staff Colleges.]

posted by Open Blogger at 12:00 PM

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